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Abstract 
The cloud computing paradigm gives rise to Web service marketplaces where complex services are 
provided by several modular vendors. Recently more and more intermediaries are pushing onto the 
market, thereby driving competition. Offering innovative business models which are capable of 
attracting service providers and consumers is a reasonable strategy to beat competitors and to take 
advantage of network effects. We develop a mechanism that introduces a novel way of distributing 
revenues among service providers – the power ratio. Its underlying presumption is not only to 
compensate service providers who actually contribute to a complex service offered at a time, but also 
to pay out partners who are on standby – i.e. vendors that support the network’s variety and stability, 
but actually do not contribute to the complex service delivered. We show that a payment function that 
is based upon the power ratio is a promising approach to draw in service providers as it outperforms 
a payment function that rewards vendors merely based on their actual allocation in terms of expected 
payoffs for different types of service vendors. 
Keywords: Service networks, Service mashups, Revenue distribution, Network effects 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Today’s shift from a product- to a service-oriented economy has strong implications on technical and 
organizational best practices. A clear trend towards tremendous simplification and a high degree of 
standardization driven by the cloud computing paradigm blurs the roles of service producers, 
intermediaries and consumers. The “living Web” becomes reality and consumers experience the 
benefit of participating in value creation processes. Amazon announced that the bandwidth consumed 
by their Web service offerings such as the Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)1 or the Simple Storage 
Service (S3)2 firstly exceeded the bandwidth consumed by all global Amazon shopping Web sites3 in 
2007 for the first time. Adapting this consumer trend, Amazon started to outsource even more 
complex core competencies such as their payment process as the Flexible Payment Service (FPS)4 to 
be consumed by end users or seamlessly integrated in situational applications by software developers. 
From a technical perspective, dynamic Web services are increasingly used in the context of service 
mashups and situational applications facilitating lightweight approaches such as RESTful architectures 
(Fielding 2000) and slim messaging formats such as JSON (Crockford 2006). The service mashup 
platform ProgrammableWeb5 reported that 66% of all listed APIs expose REST interfaces, foretelling 
the trend to an internet of interoperable (Web) services. From an organizational and economic 
perspective, value is created by the fruitful interplay of various distributed service providers that 
jointly contribute to an integrated solution that meets individual customers’ needs.  
In summary, these trends foster a rapid growth of Service Value Networks (SVNs) that are formed in a 
short-term fashion in order to provide customized complex services to multifaceted service consumers. 
To face customer requirements, service providers leverage their core competencies SVNs in order to 
offer joint complex services. Such complex services typically involve the assembly and invocation of 
several component services offered by a multitude of partners in order to complete a multi-step 
business functionality (Papazoglou 2007). The actual complex service requested by the buyer is thus 
dynamically created from the offerings of a pool of sellers. Value creation in SVNs is mostly 
coordinated by a central mediating entity such as today’s leading service platforms: Salesforce6 with 
the Web service market place AppExchange7 and its development platform force.com8, Xignite9 with 
the Splice Mashup Platform10, and StrikeIron with the StrikeIron service integration platform11, just to 
name a few. This recent development drives competition between different service platforms and Web 
service market places. Service intermediaries have to stay competitive by differentiating their business 
model. A reasonable strategy in this context is to attract market participants (service providers as well 
as consumers) by offering novel and innovative pricing models that leverage competitive advantages. 
In order to boost network growth and foster increasing returns, it is inevitable to attract a critical mass 
of participants. Speaking of service providers, these participants do not necessarily have to be the most 
competitive ones – as long as the mass of vendors attracted make sure that a sufficiently large number 
of consumers enter the platform. If such an SVN is capable of attracting a good share of potential 
customers, previously not attracted providers might also feel impelled to join the SVN due to network 
effects (Shapiro and Varian 1999). The more service consumers join the platform, the more attractive 
                                              
1 http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/ 
2 http://aws.amazon.com/s3/ 
3 http://aws.typepad.com/aws/2008/05/lots-of-bits.html 
4 http://aws.amazon.com/fps/ 
5 http://www.programmableweb.com/ 
6 http://www.salesforce.com/ 
7 http://sites.force.com/appexchange/apex/home 
8 http://www.salesforce.com/platform/ 
9 http://www.xignite.com/ 
10 http://splice.xignite.com/ 
11 http://www2.strikeiron.com/Solutions/Overview.aspx 
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the market becomes for service providers since both sides of the market positively value the number of 
participants on the other market side. We seek to initiate such network effects by compensating all 
available vendors in the SVN that are able to fulfill a specific customer request, not only the ones that 
are actually allocated in a specific service composition. These payments are realized by radically 
shifting the traditional notion of purely allocation-based revenues towards a re-distribution among all 
vendors that are able to provide value. 
This paper proceeds as follow: In the next section we motivate service value networks and formally 
model them. Section 3 provides our novel mechanism to distribute revenues in service networks that is 
able to trigger network effects as described above. Subsequently, the mechanism is benchmarked 
analytically and numerically in order to outline its ability to foster network growth. We conclude with 
a summary and implications. 
2 SERVICE VALUE NETWORKS 
As introduced in Section 1, our application scenario are service value networks which we define as 
follows (Blau et al. 2009b).  
 
Definition 2.1. Service value networks. Service value networks are business networks which provide 
business value through the agile and market-based composition of complex services from a registered, 
but open pool of complementary as well as substitutive standardized service modules through a 
ubiquitously accessible network orchestration platform.  
A service value network is described by means of a simplified state chart model (Harel and Naamd 
1996) and is aligned with the representation in Zeng et al. (2003). State charts have proven to be the 
preferred choice when specifying process models. They expose well-defined semantics and provide 
flow constructs offered by established modeling languages such as WS-BPEL. Therefore, they allow 
for simple serialization in standardized formalisms. Using a formal notation, a service value network is 
represented by a directed, k-partite, and acyclic graph. Each partition or candidate pool   represents a 
specific class of required (business) functionality. Without loss of generality we assume that each 
service is owned by a different service provider. Thus, the set of nodes 1{ , , }NV v v   equals the set of 
service providers12 that act in the network. Source ( sv ) and sink ( fv ) formalize complex services as 
an end-to-end connection and are not considered vendors in the network. An edge ije E  denotes a 
composition relationship between services iv  and jv . That is, a link between two nodes denotes the 
technical feasibility of connecting two services (interoperability) on the one hand and the vendors’ 
willingness to cooperate on the other hand. Edges are only possible between nodes of adjoing 
candidate pools.  
Each service jv  exhibits a service configuration j  that is characterized by a vector 1 { ,..., }Mj j ja a  
where mja  is an attribute value of attribute type m  of service jv . Attribute types can be either 
functional attribute types or non-functional attribute types (e.g. availability or privacy). A service’s 
configuration represents the quality level provided and differentiates its offering from other 
services. Furthermore let ijp  attached to ije  denote the price
13  for service jv  when being allocated as 
successor of service iv . 
                                              
12 The terms service, service provider and vendor are used interchangeably. 
13 We do not allocate prices to the incoming edges of the sink since fv  is not considered a vendor. Consequently, links 
, if ie v V  are not included in E  
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Figure 1. Exemplary formalization of a service value network 
Accordingly, G  is assembled as follows: ({ },{ })S f ifG V v v E e    . We are particularly 
interested in formalizing instantiable composite service instances as they symbolize a value creating 
output of G . This set of feasible paths from source to sink is denoted  1: ,..., LF F F , 
,: \ { , , }i s f i fF G v v e . *F F shall denote the allocated path in the network. 
Figure 1 shows an exemplary formalization of a service value network with | | 2   functionality 
clusters as a result of a customer’s requirement specification. There are three paths in G . Every 
feasible path from source to sink represents a possible realization (instance) of a complex service. For 
instance, such a path is 1 1 3 1 13({ , },{ , })sF v v e e . 
3 ALLOCATION AND REVENUE DISTRIBUTION 
In order to implement our core idea to value distribution, we need to define a measure to capture a 
player’s contribution to the overall network (which we will call the power ratio). When defining a 
mechanism that incorporates such a measure, one needs to keep in mind desired properties to be 
fulfilled. In markets, self-interested service providers act according to their private preferences for 
different outcomes. We consult mechanism design to implement the desired system-wide solution to 
our decentralized optimization problem (Parkes 2001). Fairness properties firstly introduced by 
Shapley (1953) and to establish a distribution logic which considers more than the allocated providers 
are essential and met by the power ratio (Conte et al. 2009). However, these fairness axioms shall not 
be the focus of this paper. Instead, we concentrate on motivating and evaluating another crucial design 
desideratum: the mechanism’s ability to trigger network entry and growth. 
3.1 Distributing Value in Service Networks: A Literature Review 
In contrast to traditional mechanisms that distribute revenues merely among allocated service 
providers as e.g. discussed in Parkes (2001), the power ratio re-allocates monetary flows to any service 
provider that accounts for a positive value for the network. Academic literature already started to 
investigate efficient allocation and pricing in such service networks (cp. e.g. Blau et al. 2009a), 
however, did not yet consider peculiarities of network formation in the growth phase of such 
ecosystems that suggest to implement alternative logics of distributing value amongst participants.  
Such alternative distribution logics compared to traditional mechanism design can be retrieved from 
cooperative game theory. Considering coalition games ( , )V   with a finite set of players 
1{ ,..., }NV v v  and a characteristic function   which maps a coalition of players T V  to a real 
numbered value, well-known approaches are, for example, the core and stable sets. Most importantly, 
both concepts assign a set of payments to players which are oftentimes empty or ambiguous (Mas-
Colell et al. 1995). The Shapley value differs from above-mentioned approaches. It always provides a 
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unique solution, i.e. a single payment to each player which is based on the average marginal 
contribution she or he yields to a coalition (Shapley 1953). Hence, it denotes the average power or 
significance of a player iv V . However, the basic assumption in a coalition is that a player iv V is 
able to cooperate with any player jv V . This does not hold true, though, for networks where due to 
functional or strategic restrictions links between players are of prime importance. Myerson (1977) 
extended the Shapley value to network structures. The range of possibilities to form coalitions is 
reduced to a given network topology G , resulting in the following allocation function ( , )iY G   for a 
player iv V : 
(1)
 
\{ }
!( 1)!
( , ) ( ( { }) ( ))
!ii iT V v
T V T
Y G T v T
V
  
          
An assumption inherited from the use of characteristic functions is superadditivity, requiring that a 
cooperation among more players must always be more fruitful than cooperations including fewer 
members. The fact that larger cooperations might not create any additional value is taken care of in 
Jackson (2005), replacing characteristic functions by monotonic covers ˆ  of the value function14 for 
all  'G G  with 'ˆ ( ) max ( ')G GG G  .  
In this article we base our payment function upon Jackson (2005), include the characteristics of SVNs 
into the measure, and stress the overall network perspective as we show in the subsequent section.  
3.2 Mechanism Implementation 
In order to prepare service provisioning, information needs to be exchanged between the involved 
parties. Besides the requested service functionality fnc stated in a standardized format most possibly 
induced by the platform, the customer’s service request is defined by the configuration 
lF
  of the 
complex service. The latter evolves as the aggregation of all attribute values of contributing services 
on the path lF  such that
1( , , )
l l l
M
F F F    , l ij lm mF e F ja  . The aggregation operation   of attribute 
values depends on the characteristics of the respective attribute. The requester’s valuation for the 
offered service configuration is idiosyncratic. Likewise, the coherence between price and attribute 
qualities depends on the requester’s individual preference. Both weightings are depicted in the 
requester’s scoring function Sc for a complex service lF  (Asker and Cantillion 2008):  
(2) 
1
( ) ( )
l l
M m
F m Fm
Sc     
The scoring rule is specified by a set of weights 1{ , , }M     with 1 1M mm    defining the 
requester’s preferences for each attribute type. Attributes are normalized such that : [0;1]
l
m
F  . A 
score of 0 induces a customer utility of zero and a score of 1 denotes maximum utility. Furthermore, 
the service requester needs to indicate his maximum willingness to pay   for a service yielding a 
score of 1. 
Subsequently, the requested functionality is being forwarded to the potential pool of service providers 
by the platform operator. Thereupon, vendors willing to participate submit their service offers to the 
platform operator. Besides above-defined fnc , service offers consist of a bid ( )ij ijb e   including a 
service configuration j  and a price bid ijp  submitted for a service jv  as successor of iv  as 
introduced in Section 2. 
                                              
14 Jackson (2005) introduced value functions as a richer object than characteristic functions incorporating both costs and 
benefits. 
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After the submission of the service request and the service offers, the platform operator dynamically 
builds the ad hoc service value network G  that fulfils the customers’ needs (cf. Section 2). Now, the 
platform operator has to solve the problem of allocating a path *F and distributing payoffs in a manner 
that is in line with the design desiderata. This problem shall be solved by the mechanism 
implementation ( , )m o t  with o  being the allocation function and t  being the transfer function. 
Let 
l ij l
F ije F
p represent the sum of the internal price bids submitted that constitute the complex 
service lF  . Further, let lF  denote the overall utility of path lF  based on the submitted bids. lF  is 
represented by its score for the customer net of the sum of the submitted prices for the edges included 
in lF : 
(3)  l l lF F FSc      
Definition 3.1. Allocation function. The allocation function :o F maps the service providers’ bids 
to a feasible complex service lF F  that maximizes the overall utility: 
(4)  0 :  : argmax argmax( )l l l l
l l
F F F F
F F F F
o Sc
 
          
Let us now turn to the monetary transfers distributed. The transfer function t  is composed of two 
components. The first component is directly associated with the winner path determination. That is, 
analogue to a first price auction, each allocated service provider receives its price bid ijp . 
The second component shall be the lever to implement the design desiderata such as network growth 
by monetizing the providers’ contribution to the overall SVN. To approach such contributions, we 
adopted the concept of value functions from cooperative game theory (cp. Section 3.1). In line with 
Jackson (2005), we interpret value functions as objects representing costs and benefits, considering 
prices and service attributes as central indicators for the value that is generated by the network or sub-
networks, respectively.  
As introduced in Section 2, paths from source to sink represent feasible complex services. Only those 
are considered when assigning a value to a set of service providers and their corresponding links 
( , )S Si i iS V E S   with S  being the set of all cooperations theoretically possible in G . A cooperation 
that does not include a feasible path is assigned a value ( ) 0jS  . As soon as a cooperation yields 
more than one path through G , the path providing the highest value is decisive for the calculation of 
the value function. We consult the overall utility function introduced in (2) and define the value 
function for cooperations jS S  as a function : S  as follows: 
(5) 
 max  , if  , , ,  
0, othe
( ) :
rwise
l j
l l ll j l jF FS F F
j
F S F ScF S S
S
 
    

 

  
 
In order to determine the power ratio of the players in the network, we define an allocation rule as a 
function : nY S  . Each service provider that generates a positive value (i.e. 
 l lF FSc    holds true for at least one complex service the respective provider is a part of) is 
considered a vital vendor. Incorporating (5) and the concept of considering the overall network we get 
(6) as a direct extension of (1). For all cooperations iv  can theoretically join (6a), term (6c) takes a 
positive value whenever iv  is pivotal to it. This value is then weighted by the probability of the 
underlying cooperation to form assuming that the sequence of the players to join this cooperation is 
equally likely (6b). 
Page 6 of 1218th European Conference on Information Systems
 The power ratio of service provider iv  is calculated as follows: 
(6) 
 with \{ }
!( 1)!
( , ) ( ( { , }) ( ))
!S jj k i
S S
j j
i i G j i S i jS V V v
V V V
Y S S v E S
V
   
         
  
  (a) (b) (c)  
The set of all incoming edges of a node iv  within a cooperation jS  is denoted jS iE . As soon as a 
player iv  enters a cooperation jS , jS iE  is also added. Based upon the circumstance that the path 
*F  
yielding the maximum overall utility *F , is being chosen, its value *( )F  will be distributed via the 
power ratio. Consequently, the overall transfer function assembles as follows: 
Definition 3.2. Transfer function. The power ratio-based transfer function (PRTF) consists of two 
components. The first component is directly dependent on the allocation in analogy to a first price 
auction. The second component accounts for the overall network view drawing on Shapley-style 
calculus: 
(7)  
if  *
otherw
:
e
,
s, i
ij jP jR
j
j
vp F
t


 
 
By distributing *F , the mechanism is budget balanced, i.e. outside payments are not required to 
realize the payment scheme. Budget balance is said to be compulsory since the platform operator 
cannot subsidize the mechanism in the long run by constantly leveling out side payments (Parkes 
2001). In spite of budget balance, the PRTF fosters network growth as we show in the next section 
that. 
4 NETWORK GROWTH 
In this section we analyze the PRTF’s ability to incentivize service providers to join the service value 
network. As a suitable benchmark to evaluate the growth incentives implemented by a market using 
PRTF ( ( , )PRPRTFm o t ), a market ( , )EQETFm o t  implementing an equal transfer function EQt  is 
consulted. The equal transfer function (ETF) distributes the system’s surplus *( )F  equally among all 
allocated service provider as follows: 
(8) *
1 ,
0, otherw s
*
i e
if  jEQ ij F
j
p v F
t C
  

 
with C being the number of candidate pools present in the SVN. That is, the ETF distributes the 
surplus in equal shares to each allocated service provider. The ETF represents a neutral payment 
scheme compared to PRTF as it equally distributes the same surplus, however, does not implement 
particular incentives. To summarize, both mechanisms implement the same allocation function o  as 
outlined in Definition 3.1. However, they differ in respect to the transfer function which distributes 
payments among service providers. 
4.1 Analytical Considerations 
In order to determine which market is better suited to incentivize network effects, a comparison of 
expected payoffs for service providers when deciding upon entering PRTFm  or ETFm  is required. As 
both mechanisms are obviously individually rational, i.e. service providers do not have to be forced to 
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participate in the market as they are never worse-off by doing so, their decision solely depends on the 
expected payoff they gain in each market. Basically, expected payoffs assemble as follows: 
(9)      * *( ) : ( )PRTF o oj j ij j ij j jF FE prob o p U c prob o U         
(10)  * *1( ) : ( ) ( )ETF oj j ij ij j jF FE prob o p U c prob o UC           
while mj denotes vendor jv ’s profit in market m . The probability ( )jprob o  indicates the probability 
of service jv  being allocated, while ( )jprob o  denotes the probability of the respective service being 
not allocated. oj denotes the percentage of the surplus that is distributed to vendor jv  if allocated, 
analogously, oj  stands for the percentage of the surplus granted if jv is not allocated. Finally, ijc  
symbolizes the costs for service jv  to be delivered.  
For simplicity, we assume that the costs ijc  equal the internally bid price ijp . Further we assume that 
an arbitrary service provider can choose which market to enter without additional cost. That is, jv  can 
choose from two actions , }{ PRTF ETFm ma  out of its action space. Depending on the interoperability 
and the bid price and service configuration, it is then – given the customer’s preferences and the 
network topology - either allocated or not allocated. In case of PRTFm , jv  realizes a profit of *
o
j F
U  if 
allocated or *oj FU  if not allocated. Accordingly, choosing ETFm , the payment amounts to *1 FUC  if 
allocated while jv  leaves empty-handed if not allocated. 
PRTFm
PRTFm=a ETFm=a
ije oÎ ije oÏ
*
o
j F
Ud *1 FUC
0
ije oÎ ije oÏ
ETFm
j
*
o
j F
Ud Profit
 
Figure 2.  Action space of an arbitrary service provider 
An analytical comparison of PRTF and ETF is not trivial. The complexity of the calculation of the set 
of internal cooperations as required in (6b) is exponential in their input as there are 2N sub-graphs in a 
graph G  with V N  nodes15. Therefore, formal proofs are only possible to a limited extent 
including a large number of restrictions as shown in the following theorem. 
Theorem 1. Assuming a fully intermeshed network16 which features exactly K  service providers in 
each candidate pool and identical prices and qualities (i.e. ijp  ,  j jv V   ), the expected 
                                              
15 Our application of the power ratio in emerging SVNs narrows the importance of an efficient (i.e. polynomial) calculation 
of the transfer. Sizes of realistic networks (cp. Table 2) and larger are small enough to tackle the calculation using the logic 
proposed in (6) on the time scale of seconds. 
16 According to the rules stated in Section 2: Links are only permitted between adjoing clusters. 
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payoff for an arbitrary service provider in PRTFm  equals the expected payoff in ETFm , i.e. 
( ) ( )PRTF ETFj jE E  . 
Proof. Since all vendor in the SVN are alike, their allocation probability is directly connected with the 
number of service providers K  present in each candidate pool as outlined in (11): 
(11) 
1( )jprob o K
  
Hence, the probability of not being allocated assembles as follows: 
(12) 
1( )j
Kprob o
K
  
Taking (11) and (12) as a basis, the expected payoff in PRTFm  can be calculated. The power ratio for all 
present vendors is identical since they take over analog roles in the SVN. 
(13) * * *
1 1 1 1 1( )PRTFj F F F
KE U U U
K N K N N
       
According to (8), the ETF leads to the following expected payoff: 
(14) * *
1 1 1( )ETFj F FE U UK C N
     
But how do the payoffs evolve in case of different bid prices, quality attributes, and/or interoperability 
relationships? Let us consider two simple variations of the assumptions made in Theorem 1: 
 We start with service provider iv  with hip     ceteris paribus. That is, this vendor creates less 
utility than any other vendor in the SVN. Thus, ( ) 0iprob o  . Nevertheless, in the PR-based 
market, iv  is pivotal to certain cooperations as long as paths including iv  yield a positive utility. 
Based on (9) and (10), this vendor faces the following expected profits in ETFm  and PRTFm :  *( ) 0 ( ) ( )  if ETF PRTF oi i i i FE E prob o U         . Since the surplus distributes is identical in 
both the ETF and the PRTF market, some other participants must lose a portion of their payment.  
 On the other hand, one can construct a situation where a service provider jv  offers a price bid 
of ijp     ceteris paribus. In this case, ( ) 1iprob o   since jv  creates a utility that is higher than 
the utility created by any other vendor. Based on (9) and (10), this leads to  *
1( ) 1ETFj FE UC
    and 
 *( ) 1PRTF oi j FE U   . According to the vendor’s contribution to the network, i.e. in this case, 
dependent on  , 1[ ,1)oj N   can be either greater or less than 
1
C
, such that a comparison of 
( )ETFjE  and ( )PRTFjE   is not possible by implication. 
 
Generally, above-stated considerations still require various restrictive assumptions such as, for 
instance, a fully intermeshed network and identical prices and quality attributes. A relaxation of these 
assumptions leads to a multitude of dependencies within the analytical considerations which do not 
allow formal proofs within reason. Therefore, we present a numerical approach to study the effects of 
a PR-based transfer function in order to derive more general results that also allow for strategic 
recommendations.    
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4.2 Numerical Approach 
In this section we seek to numerically show that the market implementing a power ratio-based transfer 
function attracts more service providers than the ETF-based market as stated in the following 
hypothesis.  
Hypothesis. PRTFm  attracts a greater number of service providers than ETFm . 
To do so, we apply an agent-based simulation, modeled as an N -person game. Purpose of the 
numerical approach is to relax the assumptions made in Section 4.1. That way, we are able to vary the 
network topology, the density of the network (i.e. the degree of interoperability relations in the SVN), 
bid prices and service configurations, and customer requirements. For each of the different network 
topologies, we simulated 25,000M   rounds, in each of which a random network density ( [0.5;1] ) 
and random price bids and service configurations were drawn from a uniform distribution in the 
interval (0;1] . The service attributes are aggregated via an average function, i.e. 1
l j l
F jv F
a
C 
  . 
Further, in each simulation round, different customer types { ,  ,  }R low medium high  were drawn with 
variable willingness to pay (0;1.5 )C   17. The three different customer types represent different 
customer valuations for service quality; 1r low  represents a rather undemanding customers whereas 
3r high represents a premium customer. 2r medium  is situated right in the middle of 1r  and 3r .  
As shown in Figure 2, an arbitrary agent jv  is drawn in each round. This service provider is then 
classified according to its bid price and its service configuration in one of nine classes 
1 9( ,..., )D d d as depicted in Table 1. 
 
Price bid / Service quality (0;0.33]jq   (0.33;0.67]jq   (0.67;1]jq   
(0;0.33]ijp   1 ( , )d low low  2 ( , )d low med  3 ( , )d low high  
(0.33;0.67]ijp   4 ( , )d med low  5 ( , )d med med  6 ( , )d med high  
(0.67;1]ijp   7 ( , )d high low  8 ( , )d high med  9 ( , )d high high  
Table 1:  Classification of service provider types 
After classifying the arbitrarily chosen service provider according to Table 1, its (hypothetical) payoffs 
PRTF
j  and ETFj are calculated in each of the 25,000  simulation rounds. Table 2 shows the results of 
the simulation runs by comparing the expected payoffs in PRTFm  and ETFm  for all agent classes. The 
hypothesis is divided into nine sub-hypotheses stating that PRTFm  attracts a greater number of service 
providers than ETFm  for agent class d . These sub-hypotheses are tested using a one-tailed matched-
pairs t-test as the large number of observations ( 25,000M  ) assures robustness of the t-test to 
violations of the normality assumptions. We performed analyses for multiple topologies as listed 
below: 1 2 3 4 5{ ( 2, 3), (3,3), (3,4), (4,4), (5,3)}Z z C K z z z z        . 
 
 
                                              
17 A sensitivity analysis of different upper bounds Ua of a showed that its effect follows the same direction, however, is 
more distinct with a slightly larger upper bound. For small upper bounds U Ca £ , the customer utility is oftentimes too low 
for a transaction to complete, i.e. such that a path provides positive value.  
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D  ( )mdE  , 1z  ( )mdE  , 2z  ( )mdE  , 3z  ( )mdE  , 4z  ( )mdE  , 5z  
PRTFm  ETFm  PRTFm  ETFm  PRTFm  ETFm  PRTFm  ETFm  PRTFm  ETFm  
1d  0.137** 0.125 0.158** 0.146 0.117** 0.104 0.125** 0.113 0.173* 0.169 
2d  0.244 0.290 0.226 0.267 0.179 0.210 0.176 0.202 0.226 0.268 
3d  0.350 0.421 0.298 0.366 0.239** 0.307 0.230 0.294 0.275 0.346 
4d  0.091** 0.056 0.109** 0.066 0.078** 0.036 0.089** 0.042 0.135** 0.077 
5d  0.158** 0.134 0.168** 0.144 0.118** 0.094 0.122** 0.086 0.170** 0.134 
6d  0.231 0.229 0.215** 0.198 0.160** 0.146 0.156** 0.131 0.210* 0.204 
7d  0.042** 0.021 0.070** 0.029 0.042** 0.016 0.053** 0.012 0.094** 0.035 
8d  0.082** 0.047 0.121** 0.088 0.073** 0.040 0.072** 0.043 0.124** 0.074 
9d  0.124** 0.089 0.155** 0.135 0.088** 0.060 0.100** 0.063 0.147** 0.101 
Table 2:  Expected payoffs of service provider classes in PRTFm  and ETFm  subject to different 
topologies. * denotes significance at the level of p=0.1, ** denotes significance at the 
level of p=0.01. If there is no asterisk, significance is not given. 
It is now relevant how many of the service provider classes prefer PRTFm  over ETFm . If all classes of 
service providers appear in equal shares, presuming that service provider types are equally likely, the 
underlying simulation shows that at least 66.7% (in case of 1 (2,3)z  ) of the service providers 
significantly prefer PRTFm  (since ( ) ( )
PRTF ETF
d dE E  , for  all other tested topologies, 77.8% of the 
service providers choose PRTFm . That is, the sub-hypotheses can be accepted for at least six out of nine 
service provider classes. Vice versa, not all of the service providers are attracted. This is straight 
forward, since both PRTF and ETF distribute the same surplus *FU . Therefore, if some of the service 
providers receive a larger share of it, others must be worse off. It is obvious that the most competitive 
service providers ( 2d and 3d ) expect a higher payoff in ETFm  than in PRTFm . However, service 
providers with intermediate price and quality tend to choose the PRTF market, likewise vendors that 
offer higher prices but lower quality. The latter class of agents can still be beneficial to an SVN as 
long as they contribute to the overall welfare. Furthermore, such providers contribute to the variety of 
the network, making it more attractive for service customers. This larger number of service providers 
in PRTFm  can be interpreted as the kind of variety, multitude, and stability (in a sense of reliability) 
customers value and honor when deciding on which market to enter (Church et al. 2008). To 
summarize, the hypothesis stated in this section can be accepted given the assumption that service 
provider types occur uniformly distributed in an SVN. Furthermore, we assume that customers’ 
preferences are equally distributed and that customers generally prefer networks yielding a greater 
variety over networks offering only little alternative services. Our simulation cannot claim to be 
complete. Therefore, the accepted hypothesis should be interpreted as an indication of the PRTF’s 
potential to network growth. 
5 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
Addressing the question of how growth of service ecosystems can be fostered by adequate 
coordination, novel mechanism design desiderata come to attention. Complementary to the traditional 
objectives in mechanism design, the work at hand pursues the goal of implementing a mechanism 
which supports the development of healthy service value networks (SVNs) while accounting for 
network effects. With the presented power ratio-based transfer function (PRTF), we reward parties 
that are willing and ready to contribute their core competencies to value creation if needed and 
therefore increase the network’s variety and flexibility. Our evaluation showed that a service 
marketplace implementing the PRTF is potentially able to foster high-volume network growth 
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compared to a traditional approach by leveraging the power of network effects. The quantity of 
attracted service providers leads to the attraction of service consumers that base their decision to enter 
a market upon the expected future size of the network (Shapiro and Varian 1999), thereby activating 
network effects which provide additional value for vendors. As a consequence, service providers that 
chose a different platform so far are also likely to be forced to join the PRTF-based market. 
Furthermore, the defined classes are not given basic knowledge – especially in newly emerging market 
segments, a self-assessment of service providers is not trivial. Risk-averse vendors are likely to 
systematically undervalue their competitiveness which generally makes them tend towards the market 
that yields a more secure payment. In this connection, offering a service on a specific platform 
involves sunk investments. Uncertain revenues compared to these initial investments might prompt 
sellers not to join an SVN. Knowing that there will be a recurring payment even if one’s service is not 
regularly allocated might lower the entry barrier for service vendors, somewhat providing security 
through reconciliation of interests, at least in the initial phase of the platform. Our PRTF for revenue 
distribution in SVNs is a promising approach to tackle the well-known chicken-egg-problem to attract 
both sides of a market – consumers as well as providers (Gandal 2002). 
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